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I. Introduction
This chapter examines the interplay between human rights, constitutional law, the compulsory redistribution of land and the forces of globalisation. Rural poverty and gross inequality seem to compel state intervention in land ownership, and yet a strong right to property can entrench the very interests that governments wish to challenge. This is especially acute in the developing world, where a right to full compensation for land taken for redistribution can make it financially impossible for governments to take significant action.
This chapter therefore concentrates on two states -India and the Philippines -where politicians and judges have frequently dealt with the tension between the egalitarianism and relief of poverty, on one side, and the right to property on the other. In both countries, promises of redistribution and agrarian reform have been part of political life since World War II, if not before. At one time, such promises were very much the norm for post-colonial nations. 1 Many hoped that implementing promises of 'land to the tiller' would address both inequality and poverty, and that compulsion would be necessary for meaningful action.
However, in recent decades, most states have moved away from redistribution. In the Philippines, the national programme of land acquisition that was initiated in 1987 is drawing to a close; in India, there is even less activity. Yet, in both countries, the level of inequality in the distribution of land remains high and success has been only partial, at best.
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In these countries, land reform has featured in constitutional law, both in specific provisions and as a key consideration in the framing of rights to property. The courts in both countries have produced rich jurisprudence on the interpretation of relevant constitutional clauses. From independence, the highest courts in India and the Philippines maintained a requirement of full compensation for land taken for redistribution (and other purposes). There have been interludes where the courts allowed greater flexibility but, as this chapter demonstrates, the general trend is for full compensation. The impact on the cost of redistribution has made it more difficult to implement reform, and helps to explain why the achievement is less than anticipated. Indeed, the Indian and Philippine record on redistribution contrasts sharply with that of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. 2 These countries carried out the most comprehensive post-World War II programmes for land reform and redistribution in Asia (leaving aside the socialist nations). Moreover, as in India and the Philippines, land redistribution was implemented through the use of legal powers of compulsory acquisition, rather than consensual, market-led reform or the confiscatory methods of the socialist governments. However, the cost of compensation was significantly lower: in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, compensation was based on the value of rents or crop yields, and generally fell well below market values. As explained below, proposals for such compensation standards were brought forward in India and the Philippines. However, they were either dismissed before they could be implemented, or they were subject to constitutional challenges that restored the market standard. Arguably, these constitutional 3 differences had the effect of making extensive land redistribution far more difficult to achieve.
Of course, factors other than compensation have been important. External forces have played a crucial role: it is worth noting, for example, that the United States supported redistribution in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. 3 Both the American and the national governments were fearful that, without land reform, the peasants would support communist insurgencies. In India, the United States had less influence, and in any case the communist threat was much weaker. However, in the Philippines, where American influence has been greater, the focus has been on military action, rather than social measures aimed at winning over the rural peasantry. More recently, the World Bank urged the Philippine government to abandon its programme of compulsory redistribution in favour of market-led, voluntary transfers. 4 Whilst external forces are undoubtedly important, this chapter concentrates on the internal forces of globalisation, and in particular on the tendency of judges to frame their reasons for supporting full compensation by reference to comparative law. The chapter demonstrates that, so far as the judges are concerned, comparative law has almost invariably pointed them in the direction of the liberal model of state power and property. By this view, the right to property is an integral element of personal liberty: the rights of property describe a part of individual autonomy that deserves the same level of protection as (for example) 4 rights to freedom of expression and conscience. 5 This is not to say that property is immune from expropriation in the public interest. However, where this does occur, the owner has no obligation to shoulder a greater part of the burden of serving the public interest than any other citizen. In constitutional and human rights law, this is expressed through provisions that guarantee full compensation for the compulsory acquisition of property. This ensures that the owner suffers no economic loss beyond the additional tax burden in funding compensation that falls on all citizens.
This has had two main doctrinal implications. First, the courts of India and the Philippines have generally interpreted constitutional property clauses as requiring full compensation for taking, even where there is some doubt that the plain language or original intention would justify such a reading. Second, in cases related to property, the courts have given little to no weight to constitutional provisions on social justice, egalitarianism and land reform. In the Philippines, the result is that redistribution cannot proceed unless the landowners are paid full compensation for their land. In effect, the option of providing belowmarket compensation, as in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, has not been available. The situation in India is more complex: the right to property normally requires full compensation, but it does allow exceptions. Moreover, there are recognised mechanisms by which the legislature may narrow the scope of judicial review. Nevertheless, the ideology of property remains liberal.
The chapter begins by considering the framing of constitutional rights to property in each country at independence, and the subsequent rise of the liberal interpretation of compensation guarantees. It then follows the weakening of the liberal position through the 1970s and 1980s before considering the revival of the liberal model in more recent years.
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Throughout, it shows how comparative law has been utilised to justify support for the liberal model. It closes with an examination of the comparative methodology of the courts, by asking whether it is a form of judicial learning from comparator models, a type of signalling (and if so, the intended audience), or a means of legitimating socially conservative judgments intended to support a landed elite.
As this collection concentrates on human rights and property, it may appear that a chapter on constitutional law is out of place. However, the judicial analysis of the right to property under international human rights law, especially that of the European Convention on Human Rights, is very similar to that of constitutional law in these countries. In practical terms, the rights to property in the constitutional law of India and the Philippines provide a similar constraint on state power as the right contained in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention. Indeed, the Indian Supreme Court has increasingly referred to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on the European right to property in its constitutional jurisprudence. 6 It is not surprising that this is the case: in Europe, India and the Philippines, the rights to property -constitutional or international -are treated as safeguards of individual freedom and human dignity in the face of state power. Hence, for this collection, it makes sense to concentrate on the national jurisprudence of constitutional property rights when seeking to identify global trends on human rights and property.
II. Liberal, Socialist and Social Democrat Constitutional Theories at

Independence
Liberal views on land ownership had a strong influence on the framing of the colonial constitutions of both India and the Philippines. In India, as in England itself, questions were 6 frequently raised over the legitimacy of land laws that allowed and sustained the concentration of holdings. 7 In much of India, these patterns of concentrated ownership were created by the British. 8 In the late eighteenth century, the British East India Company sought to create a landholding system that would secure it a satisfactory level of income and, ideally, provide incentives for the further development of agriculture. Their solution lay in the creation of a near-feudal system of tenure, under which a group of tax collectors and administrators were allocated territory over which they had the right to set and collect rents from tenants. In exchange, they were required to make a fixed annual payment to the Company. This arrangement, known as the Permanent Settlement of 1793, effectively transformed the tax collectors, or 'zamindars', into private owners of extensive tracts of land.
The system did not apply throughout the country, and by the early nineteenth century the British had decided not to extend it to the remaining parts of India under their jurisdiction. It became increasingly unpopular through the twentieth century, with growing demands for tenancy reform or outright abolition of the system. However, the zamindars supported British 
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The situation changed within a short period. By the 1930s, it was obvious that Congress would not win popular support unless it took a stronger line on land reform. On the left, communist and radical movements were gathering support; on the right, the rural poor were being drawn into religious or caste conflicts, often provoked by the landed elite as a way of suggesting that the solution to rural poverty lay anywhere but in tenure reform. 33 Austin, Indian Constitution (n 27); Merillat (n 8).
34 Constitution of India, Art 38(1).
13 the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good' 35 and that the 'operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment'. 36 Many state governments had already begun to move on land reform, which immediately raised questions regarding the desirability of incorporating a right to property in the Constitution's chapter on fundamental rights.
The central issue in the Assembly concerned the amount of compensation (if any) to be provided for zamindars. As in the Philippines, the large landowners employed liberal arguments to protect their position. After lengthy debate, the Indian Assembly settled on a right to property that would leave the legislature the freedom to determine compensation. As originally enacted, Article 31 of the Constitution provided as follows:
(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
(2) No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principle on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given.
These provisions were very similar to those of the Government of India Act, 1935.
Ironically, provisions that were originally intended to protect the landowners were now employed to protect legislative power. 37 However, in the independence Constitution, it would be the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, who would give assent to legislation. Under the Government of India Act 1935, the Governor General was not responsible to the Indian provincial legislatures, and it was expected that he would exercise his discretion in favour of the landowners. In the independence Constitution, the combination 35 Constitution of India, Art 39(b).
36 Constitution of India, Art 39(c). 37 See Government of India Act, s 299(1) and (2); Art 31(3) was similar to s 299(3), except that the President held the power of approval previously held by the Governor General. In summary, the constitutional position on property in India differed greatly from that in the Philippines. 40 Politically, the rural peasantry were better able to command attention in India. Moreover, the educated urban classes that dominated the Congress Party leadership were relatively independent: their power did not depend on the landed elite, the former colonial power or foreign investors. Moreover, the Party itself was not ideologically bound to a specific position on economics and property. The liberal values of individual autonomy and equality were certainly important, especially as they challenged the systems of colonial and caste privilege that had held back many Congress members. However, social democracy and socialism were also attractive: a strong public sector, run by Indians, offered prospects for advancement that had not been available during the colonial period. By contrast, in the Philippines, the United States, as colonial power, held a veto over constitutional proposals;
whilst it allowed the introduction of section 5, it also insisted on the retention of the takings clause. 41 In any case, the peasantry lacked the organisation and influence to counterbalance the power of the landed elite over national politics. Consequently, property was not subject to the same kind of challenge as seen in India.
38 Constituent Assembly Debates, vol IX, p 31, 10 Sept 1949. 39 ibid. 40 See Austin, 1966 (n 27), for a general review.
41 Putzel (n 2) 43-66; Wolters (n 11); Riedinger (n 11).
15 Despite these differences, there was an important common feature: neither group of framers found a way to integrate social justice with a right to property. In India, the initial solution was, in essence, to take questions relating to both social justice and property away from the courts, as neither the Directive Principles nor compensation were justiciable. In the Philippines, the opposite route was taken: both compensation and social justice were justiciable. In essence, the framers of both constitutions were aware of, and drew on, the international debates on liberalism, social democracy and socialism, as well as their own national values. However, as subsequent events would show, they struggled in their effort to pull them together in a coherent structure.
III. Judicial Interpretation of the Property Clauses after Independence
After achieving independence, both countries pursued land reform and redistribution, with varying degrees of commitment and success. The territorial government did attempt to break up concentrations of land ownership; however, it worked on the principle of full compensation, and the cost soon put the programme beyond the government's financial capacity. 42 The possibility of reducing compensation was then put beyond reach by the 
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provisions so as to reinstate the guarantee of full compensation. 55 Further amendments followed; in each case, the Supreme Court would reinstate the compensation guarantee through increasingly strained interpretation of the amended provisions.
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The conflicting views between Parliament and the Supreme Court over the compensation issue became increasingly important in political life. In the 1971 election campaign, Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party blamed the Court for the lack of progress on land reform. 57 However, it is difficult to judge the real impact of the Court's defence of property on redistribution. The exclusions of the First Amendment allowed the abolition of the zamindar system to proceed, and it was largely complete by 1960. 58 However, a second phase of reform was intended to impose ceilings on holdings and redistribute the surplus to tenants. Very little progress was made from this point, but it seems that political forces were more important than judicial decisions in thwarting land redistribution. Landowners had become more adept at exerting influence through local political institutions. As Chibber puts it:
The very institutions that were supposed to implement government policy -the Congress party machine and the local state organizations -were thoroughly penetrated by groups hostile to agrarian policy. Even the halting attempts at reform tried by Nehru foundered against their resistance. Against this background, the immediate effect of the Supreme Court's judgments may have been marginal. At most, the Court merely provided another mechanism for the landed elite to protect its interests.
As the highest courts began to develop their jurisprudence on property, a common trend emerged. In both countries, the early post-independence judgments were characterised by lack of engagement with social justice and indeed with local conditions. Comparative law was part of this. In the Philippines, the Supreme Court treated American law as though it were binding. Consequently, there was no room to bring section 5 into the interpretation of 'just compensation', or indeed any other cases, as it had no American counterpart. In India, the leading cases reveal very little interest in local conditions and the reasons for land reform.
In some of the leading cases, such as Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v The Sholapur
Spinning and Weaving Co, American authorities were cited on almost every point by all of the judges. 60 In the early cases, the judges did not seek to place the right to property within a specifically Indian context. shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law', 63 it appeared that there was no guarantee of compensation; more generally, there seemed to be no scope for judicial review of legislation that authorised takings. Instead, it seemed that property owners were only protected from unlawful administrative action.
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After the Forty-Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court retreated from its earlier dogmatism on compensation. For example, in a case on old right to property, Iyer J stated 62 Arts 30(1A) and 30A (1) remained in place; they contain guarantees for religious property and certain smallholders. 68 See Putzel (n 2) 123-27 on the formulation of the programme.
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Constitution also included a declaration that all decrees issued by the President were valid law. 69 Implicitly, the doctrine on full compensation was no longer good law, at least in respect of takings under Presidential Decree No 27. The Constitution also added to the provisions on social justice, with the following:
The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. And
The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution. 70 In Chavez v Zobel, 71 
the Court upheld the provisions of Presidential Decree No 27 deeming the tenants to be owners and in Association of Rice and Corn Producers v National
Land Reform Council, it upheld the principle that 'just compensation' did not necessarily equate with full market value compensation. 72 The case did not turn on the 1973 provisions, 
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v Hon Secretary of Agrarian Reform
the Court stated that
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to intensify the meaning of the word 'compensation' to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
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The Supreme Court not only restored the earlier doctrine, but also the emphasis on 
delegated powers of eminent domain. The Court in Philippines v Hon Secretary of Agrarian
Reform did not consider whether such cases provide a useful guide to land redistribution.
Indeed, the Court made numerous approving references to social justice and land reform, but none to the potential impact of full compensation on the cost and prospects for implementation.
The 1986 Constitution also included new provisions on social justice. Section 6 of Article XII, 'National Economy and Patrimony', included a provision on the social conception of ownership:
The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.
Section 1 of Article XIII, on 'Social Justice and Human Rights', directs Congress to
give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
Sections 4 to 10 lay out detailed principles on agrarian and urban land reform, including a specific right 'of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till'.
These provisions are stronger than the provisions of the 1973 Constitution that the
Court relied on in Association of Rice and Corn Producers v National Land Reform Council,
where it held that social justice could allow for a departure from a strict reading of 'just compensation' standard. social justice -or any justice for that matter -is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law. In trying to determine just compensation for purposes of agrarian reform, we must remember that we have to look at this in the context of the Article where it is. It is in the Article on Social Justice, and the thrust of this Article is precisely to make it easier for the disadvantaged to be able to obtain land.
well as all other costs). In this respect, there is no change from the previous land redistribution schemes, as the cost of the programme quickly exceeded the capacity of the public treasury. It is worth noting, however, that section 17 of the legislation states that 'just compensation' should include consideration of 'The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers'. However, the administrative agency charged with implementing the law has set a valuation formula that does not appear to take this into account, 87 and the Supreme Court has upheld its approach. 
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In India, the conflict over compensation and property subsided after the Forty-Fourth
Amendment. This was largely due to the declining importance of land redistribution in Indian politics: unlike the Philippines, no significant programmes for redistribution were announced in the 1980s or after. This is not to say that redistribution did not continue in some States: The Supreme Court of India has therefore followed a similar path to its Philippine counterpart, in reinstating a right to compensation. However, in KT Plantation, the Court stated that the legislature has some flexibility to adapt compensation standards to the context.
The Court did not elaborate, except to say that:
Measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for lesser compensation and such a limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or unconstitutional or confiscatory. … in each case, the scheme of the impugned Act, its object, purpose as also the question whether payment of nil compensation or nominal compensation would make the impugned law unjust, unfair or unreasonable in terms of other provisions of the Constitution as indicated above. In KT Plantation, the Supreme Court briefly referred to the European right to property, although not specifically in relation to the standard for compensation. 101 However, the language employed by the Supreme Court is so close to that of James v UK that it seems likely that it borrowed directly from the European judgments. The Court also referred to constitutional principles from the United States, Germany, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as the historic writers Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Rousseau and Blackstone, to demonstrate that some form of compensation requirement is universal amongst the nations that adhere to the rule of law.
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In terms of the rhetoric, the Court has restored the post-independence approach. In terms of doctrine, there are some differences. seems that the courts in India and the Philippines see no need to examine national differences or the context in which takings occur and constitutional principles evolve. Constitutional models that integrate ideas of social obligation, public power and individual autonomy within a right to property are rarely cited; even when they are cited, as in KT Plantation, there is no discussion of the differences in approach. 106 In KT Plantation, the Court even acknowledged that the constitutional systems of Canada and the United Kingdom do not provide a justiciable right to property, but without explaining how its consideration of these systems affected its analysis of Indian law. 107 The superficiality of the analysis leads to the question: what purpose does comparative law serve? An earlier generation of comparativists argued that comparative law provides an opportunity to improve domestic law, on the basis that the analysis of laws of different systems on a specific issue helps to identify the best solution to a legal problem. 108 However, whatever the merits and limitations of this approach may be, especially in the judicial context, it has not been the purpose of using comparative law in either country. At best, the use of comparative law is observational rather than analytical, as the Philippine and Indian courts do little more than offer brief summaries of the law in other jurisdictions. No function for law is identified, and there is no discussion of the operation of the law within the host system or its practical impact in serving that function. Indeed, where there are different approaches across the comparators, there is no attempt to determine a 'best solution' from amongst them.
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An alternative view is held by those who argue that comparative law has little impact on legal change. 110 Change in law, and specifically the convergence of law, is driven by structural forces that are beyond the control of lawmakers. For example, the prominence of land reform is likely to be affected by population movements and markets for labour and land. In recent years, it could be argued that the international convergence on a liberal right to property has been driven less by judicial borrowing than by global factors such as the decline of socialism and the increased flow of international capital into land. Internally, the framing and interpretation of a right to property may have involved a comparative analysis of different models, but it would be a mistake to treat the comparative analyses as the cause for the adoption of a right to property or indeed of a liberal right to property. Hence, in India and the Philippines, one might argue that the judicial discussion of comparative law shows that the courts have favoured the liberal model of a right to property, but it does not explain why they do so.
Although these two models suggest that comparative law is either significant or irrelevant to legal change, the lack of any real functional analysis suggests that the conclusion is the same: comparative analysis has not been a driver for change. Arguably, any signalling through comparative law is aimed more at investors than the courts of other countries. Indeed, there is an extensive literature on the role of constitutional law in attracting investment. There is evidence that judges in both countries cite comparative law to assure investors that national standards are similar to international standards, and hence that there is no greater political risk to capital than elsewhere. 119 In KT Plantation, the Indian Supreme Court not only cited numerous comparative examples, but explicitly acknowledged the importance of building investor confidence in its legal system. 120 The choice of comparators also provides some evidence of this. The Philippine Supreme Court relies more on American legal authority than its Indian counterpart; arguably, this reflects the historic dependence of the Philippines on American investment and support. Moreover, neither court engages in any discussion of the law of other developing nations, or of nations that do not guarantee compensation for expropriation. Such comparators could provide more potential for judicial learning, but would not send the same signal to investors.
Finally, at least some of the cases raise the suspicion that comparative law provides a claim for legitimacy for socially conservative policies. In particular, the language of liberal right to property, within a broader scheme of internationally recognised human rights, gives a privileged minority a credible case for maintaining their position. Comparative law in the courts almost invariably supports a liberal theory of property; one of the key features of the liberal theory that emerges from comparative law is its abstraction from the local context. For example, cases from both jurisdictions demonstrate that the courts have resisted arguments that land reform requires a different approach to compensation. It is, of course, difficult to 119 See the material cited above n 4.
120 Above (n 6), [142] .
37 judge how far the courts participate in constitutional clientelism, as judges are unlikely to say that their decisions are guided by class loyalties rather than legal principle.
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Of the two courts, it seems more likely that this is the case in the Philippines. Not only has constitutional interpretation favoured landed interests, but the statutory interpretation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program legislation has done so as well. At no point has it challenged the legislature in the ways seen in India. Hence, the citation of American constitutional law provides a convenient rhetoric to justify the limits on land reform, for audiences at home and abroad. The global aspect of comparative law lacks the local or even historical context that the opponents of agrarian reform do not wish to acknowledge. Indeed, it seems that that is its attraction: it shifts the focus outward and away from local conditions, and by doing so, it undermines the case for reform. In India, the picture is more complex because the Supreme Court accepted the constitutionality of the amendments that excluded judicial review from most land reform legislation. Nevertheless, the use of comparative law has allowed the Court to maintain the separation of the right to property from social justice, as it treats the ownership of land as a matter of private law. In effect, comparative law has restricted the vocabulary for debating agrarian reform, and the global, transnational nature of liberal property has indirectly legitimated the demands of the elite for constitutional protection.
VII. Conclusion 
